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Abstract 
In Arun Property Development (Pty) Ltd v Cape Town City the 
Constitutional Court awarded compensation for land that vested in 
the City of Cape Town in terms of a regulatory framework. The 
regulatory framework, sections 25 and 28 of the Cape Land Use 
Planning Ordinance of 1985 (LUPO), provides that land needed for 
public streets and places and indicated as such on a subdivision 
plan should vest in the local authority concerned, but without 
compensation if that land is based on the normal need of providing 
the particular development with such public streets and places. The 
appellant argued that since land in excess of the normal need also 
vested in the City, it had a right to be compensated for the excess 
land that vested in the City. 
The Court, overturning two Supreme Court of Appeal decisions, 
awarded compensation. The Court hinted that the compensation 
was for the expropriation of the appellant's land that was excess to 
the normal need. In the absence of a formal expropriation 
procedure, this case note investigates whether the compensation 
could have been awarded for statutory expropriation or 
constructive expropriation. 
Therefore, the question that is posed is whether the alleged 
expropriation for which the Court awarded compensation can be 
classified as either statutory expropriation or constructive 
expropriation. It is pointed out that the Court accepted that section 
28 of the LUPO constitutes a development contribution for the land 
based on the normal need. In terms of the notion of development 
contributions, a developer has to donate land to the local authority 
concerned if that land is required to provide the particular 
development with public streets and places. A development 
contribution, as part of the administrative process of approving 
developments, is regulatory in nature and its validity is judged in 
terms of the requirements for a valid deprivation of property. 
It is argued that since the Court interpreted section 28 of the LUPO 
to provide for development contributions, the alleged expropriation 
cannot be classified as statutory expropriation. Statutory 
expropriation occurs when legislation expropriates property directly 
through mere promulgation. In this case, the excess land vested in 
the City only after an administrative action was taken to approve a 
subdivision plan. It is also argued that statutory expropriation 
cannot be recognised in South African law, due to the constitutional 
requirements for a valid expropriation in section 25(2) of the 
Constitution.  
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1 Introduction 
In Arun Property Development (Pty) Ltd v Cape Town City1 (hereafter 
Arun) the issue was whether 
... a local authority that has acquired land, by operation of legislation, from a 
private owner in a planning approval process for a residential development, 
is obliged to pay compensation for the land so acquired.2 
The local authority acquires land in terms of section 28 of the Land Use 
and Planning Ordinance 15 of 1985 (hereafter LUPO).3 Section 28 
provides that land in a development that is required for public streets and 
places will vest in the local authority without compensation "if the provision 
of the said public streets and public places is based on the normal need 
therefor arising from the said subdivision…". A distinction should 
accordingly be drawn between (i) land that is needed for the public streets 
and public places of the particular development (normal need), and (ii) 
land not required for public streets and places for the particular 
development, but still used for public streets and places (excess land). 
The appellant, a property development company, argued that section 28 
vests all land – normal need and excess land – in the local authority. 
Furthermore, the appellant argued that section 28 excludes compensation 
for the normal need land only and not for excess land and that it therefore 
had the right to be compensated for the excess land acquired by the local 
authority. 
The high court found that the relevant legislative provision vests excess 
land in the local authority, and that the appellant was entitled to be 
                                            
* BV Slade. BComm, LLB, LLM, LLD. Senior Lecturer in the Department of Public Law, 
Faculty of Law, University of Stellenbosch. E-mail: bvslade@sun.ac.za. Thanks to 
Prof ZT Boggenpoel, Prof AJ van der Walt, Dr Elsabe van der Sijde, Richard Shay 
and the participants of the Arun Day Seminar (held at the Constitutional Court on 
the 17th of July 2015) for helpful comments and suggestions. The remaining errors 
are my own. 
1  2015 2 SA 584 (CC). 
2  Arun para 1. 
3  The LUPO is set to be repealed by s 77 of the Western Cape Land Use Planning Act 
3 of 2014. This Act was assented to on the 31st of March 2014, but to date has not 
yet been proclaimed. The Spatial Planning and Land Use Management Act 16 of 
2013 necessitated the introduction of new planning legislation in the Western Cape. 
S 37 of the Western Cape Land Use Planning Act contains a provision that has an 
effect similar to that of s 28 of the LUPO. S 37(1) requires municipalities to ensure 
that land indicated in a subdivision plan as public places vests in the relevant 
municipality. Furthermore, s 37(2) states that no compensation is payable if the 
"provision of the public place is based on the normal need therefor arising from the 
subdivision". 
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compensated for the excess land that it had lost and the local authority 
(City of Cape Town Municipality) had acquired.4 The high court did not 
specifically indicate whether the vesting of the excess land, for which 
compensation was awarded, amounted to an expropriation. The 
municipality appealed against the high court decision. The Supreme Court 
of Appeal held that the respondent (Arun Property Development) was 
unable to show that the alleged excess land was indeed additional to the 
normal need, rendering the issue of compensation moot.5 Furthermore, 
the court held that the legislative provision does not enable the 
expropriation of excess land and therefore referred the appellant to its 
administrative remedies. Arun Property Development took the matter to 
the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court awarded compensation 
to the appellant, holding that the legislative provision vests all property 
indicated in the subdivision plan for public streets and places in the local 
authority; that such vesting of land in the local authority constitutes a 
legislative acquisition of the land that has the same effect as an 
expropriation; and that compensation must therefore be paid for the 
acquisition of the excess land. The regulatory provision, in as far as the 
Court interpreted it to vest the excess land in the local authority, was not 
subjected to analysis judged in terms of section 25(1) of the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa, 1996, (hereafter the Constitution), nor was 
any attention paid to the lawfulness of the decision of the administrator to 
approve the subdivision. 
At the outset the Constitutional Court stated that the decision dealt with "a 
significant constitutional issue connected to the expropriation of land and 
compensation"6 and also considered whether the vesting of the land 
amounted to an expropriation for which compensation was payable.7 
However, the Court did not clearly state that the compensation it awarded 
in the end was for the expropriation of the appellant's land. The Court 
merely held that the relevant legislative provision permits an ex lege 
transfer of ownership that has the same effect as an expropriation.8 
In South African law, expropriation usually takes place on the basis of 
legislation such as the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975 (hereafter the 
Expropriation Act), which authorises a particular functionary to expropriate 
                                            
4  Arun Property Development (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town 2012 ZAWCHC 399. 
5  City of Cape Town v Arun Property Developments (Pty) Ltd 2014 JDR 0786 (SCA). 
6  Arun para 1. 
7  Arun paras 54-62. 
8  Arun para 73. 
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property for public purposes.9 Expropriation therefore usually occurs when 
an administrator, acting on the basis of authorising legislation, through an 
administrative action formally expropriates property. Approving the 
application to develop in terms of section 25 of the LUPO constitutes an 
administrative action. The vesting in terms of section 28 of the LUPO 
therefore occurs after an administrative decision to approve the 
development plan has been made.10 However, in Arun there was no 
administrative action undertaken on the basis of legislation that formally 
expropriated the excess land. Neither section 25 nor section 28 authorises 
an administrator to expropriate land for town planning purposes. 
Therefore, the question that arises is whether the expropriation could have 
been effected in terms of a method other than administrative expropriation, 
since the legislative provision does not authorise an administrator to 
expropriate property.11 
In the light of the Court's assertion that this decision deals with an issue 
relating to the expropriation of property and compensation, this note 
considers the type of expropriation that the Court awarded compensation 
for. One possibility is to view the legislative acquisition (the ex lege 
transfer of ownership) as statutory expropriation. Statutory expropriation is 
recognised in German law, and occurs when the state intends to 
expropriate property directly in legislation without any involvement of an 
administrator or the courts.12 Another possible alternative is to view the 
Court's interpretation of the legislative provision as constructive 
expropriation (an excessive regulatory measure that has the same effect 
as an expropriation). Constructive expropriation is recognised in various 
foreign jurisdictions.13 In terms of this notion, a deprivation (or regulatory 
measure) that is excessive – thereby making it impossible to justify the 
deprivation by the purpose of the regulation – is saved from invalidity due 
                                            
9  For instance, in Erf 16 Bryntirion (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Public Works 2011 ZASCA 
246 the Minister of Public Works formally expropriated the appellant's property for a 
public purpose. See further Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 453; 
Gildenhuys Onteieningsreg 49. 
10  As shown below, the vesting of the normal need land constitutes a development 
contribution that is considered regulatory in nature. Therefore, the vesting in terms of 
the s 28 of the LUPO does not amount to an expropriation. 
11  Section 28 of the LUPO authorises the transfer of the ownership of property required 
for the creation of streets and public places, and does not authorise the expropriation 
of any additional property. 
12  Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 457. 
13  Constructive expropriation is known as regulatory takings in US law (Van der Walt 
Constitutional Property Clauses 423, 427-440) and as material expropriation in 
Swiss law (Van der Walt 2004 Stell LR 326-332). 
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to the importance of the regulation by treating it as an expropriation for 
which compensation is payable.14 
Various factors weigh against classifying the vesting in terms of section 28 
of the LUPO as an expropriation or something like an expropriation, 
irrespective of whether it may be classified as statutory expropriation or 
constructive expropriation. These will be highlighted in the discussion. The 
complex set of facts is dealt with in detail below. The Constitutional Court 
deviated from two Supreme Court of Appeal decisions as to whether the 
property developer is entitled to compensation in cases of this particular 
nature.15 Consequently the Western Cape High Court and the Supreme 
Court of Appeal decisions are discussed together with the Constitutional 
Court's judgment to establish the type of expropriation for which 
compensation was awarded. The discussion of development contributions 
follows the discussion of the decisions, since the former has a bearing on 
the discussion as to whether the compensation was awarded for statutory 
or constructive expropriation. 
The Constitutional Court's judgment in Arun is unclear about what exactly 
the compensation was awarded for. Therefore, this cursory analysis 
attempts to ask questions about the nature and the appropriateness of 
compensation as a remedy in this particular case. Although courts have a 
broad discretion to award a remedy, including compensation, that is just, 
equitable and appropriate in terms of sections 38 and 172 of the 
Constitution, it must be clear what the compensation is for. This 
contribution argues that it is not entirely clear what compensation was paid 
for in Arun. Therefore, it is questionable whether compensation was 
appropriate in the circumstances. 
2 Arun Property Development v Cape Town City16 
2.1 Facts 
The appellant applied for the subdivision of its land for the purposes of 
township development. The local authority, in this instance the City of 
Cape Town Municipality (hereafter the City), duly approved the subdivision 
                                            
14  See Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 350. See further Mostert 2003 SAJHR 
569. 
15  City of Cape Town v Helderberg Park Development (Pty) Ltd 2008 6 SA 12 (SCA); 
City of Cape Town v Arun Property Developments (Pty) Ltd 2014 JDR 0786 (SCA). 
16  Arun Property Development (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town 2012 ZAWCHC 399; City 
of Cape Town v Arun Property Developments (Pty) Ltd 2014 JDR 0786 (SCA); Arun 
Property Development (Pty) Ltd v Cape Town City 2015 2 SA 584 (CC). 
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of the land in terms of section 25 of LUPO. In terms of the approved 
subdivision plan the developer had to set aside land for the creation of 
public streets and places required for the particular township (the land 
needed for this purpose only). However, in terms of the subdivision plan 
the developer also had to set aside additional land that was not needed for 
the creation of public streets and places required by the particular 
development, but that was earmarked for the creation of higher order 
roads that would eventually cut across the land. The higher order roads 
were demarcated in terms of a structural plan that had been approved in 
1988 and it was clear that approval for subdivision would not have been 
granted by both the local and provincial authorities if provision had not 
been made for these higher order roads. The appellant's development 
plan therefore had to indicate and reserve land for the higher order roads. 
The appellant claimed compensation for the loss of land that was set aside 
for the creation of the higher order roads, in other words in excess of land 
required for the creation of public streets and places for the particular 
development. The appellant relied on section 28 of the LUPO, which 
provides that "ownership of all public streets and public places" created by 
a particular development shall vest in the local authority without 
compensation if the assignment of the land to public streets and places "is 
based on the normal need … arising from the said subdivision". The 
appellant argued that section 28 excludes the payment of compensation 
for needed land only. Therefore, it automatically had a right to be 
compensated for the excess land that had been earmarked for the building 
of higher order roads according to the structural plan that also vested in 
the City.  
2.2 High Court 
The High Court held that section 28 vests ownership of the land 
earmarked for public streets and places in the local authority, even if it is in 
excess of the land required for the provision of public streets and places 
for the particular development.17 However, section 28 permits the vesting 
of land in the local authority without compensation only if the land is 
required for the normal need of providing public streets and places for the 
particular development. The Court held that since section 28 automatically 
vests ownership in the local authority, and because no appeal and/or 
review procedures were available to the appellant, the appellant was 
entitled to compensation for the excess land. The City was therefore 
                                            
17  Arun Property Development (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town 2012 ZAWCHC 399. 
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ordered to pay compensation to the appellant, as determined in terms of 
the relevant provisions in the Expropriation Act. 
The High Court distinguished this decision from the Supreme Court of 
Appeal's majority decision in City of Cape Town v Helderberg Park 
Development (Pty) Ltd18 (hereafter Helderberg Park Development). As in 
Arun's claim, the developer in the Helderberg Park Development decision 
claimed compensation for excess land that vested in the local authority in 
terms of section 28 of LUPO after the subdivision for residential 
development had been approved. The facts in Helderberg Park 
Development were different, since an explicit condition was imposed on 
the appellant in terms of section 42(2) of the LUPO, according to which the 
developer had to cede additional land to the local authority that was in 
excess of the land required for the normal need of creating public streets 
and places, without compensation. The developer initially accepted the 
condition but later argued that it was entitled to compensation for the 
excess land. The Supreme Court of Appeal did not award compensation to 
the developer and held that the owner could have avoided the vesting of 
the land in the local authority by not proceeding with the subdivision. 
Alternatively, the developer could have relied on its internal appeal 
remedies in terms of section 44 of the LUPO. The Supreme Court of 
Appeal was of the view that what the developer sought was not 
compensation but constitutional damages.19 The court therefore did not 
view the vesting of the excess land as an expropriation but possibly as a 
deprivation whose validity should have been attacked in terms of section 
25(1) of the Constitution.20 The Supreme Court of Appeal held that the 
appellant was not entitled to damages since it had to first resort to its 
administrative remedies. The majority therefore did not regard the vesting 
of the excess land as an expropriation for which compensation was 
payable.21 However, Heher JA held in a minority judgment that the vesting 
of the land in terms of section 28 of the LUPO was "founded in a 
compulsory taking".22 According to Heher JA, section 28 must be 
                                            
18  2008 6 SA 12 (SCA). 
19  On constitutional damages, see Bezuidenhout Compensation for Excessive but 
Otherwise Lawful Regulatory State Action 250-281. 
20  Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 271-272. 
21  Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 272 notes that the majority of the Supreme 
Court of Appeal effectively rejected the doctrine of regulatory takings (as it is known 
in US law) or constructive expropriation, but in effect adopted the German approach 
to regulation that is excessive, namely that it should be declared invalid. 
22  Helderberg Park Development para 39. In South African law only two types of 
infringements with vested property rights are generally recognised, namely 
deprivation and expropriation. A "taking" as it is understood in US law refers to 
instances of formal expropriations (as in South African law) but also includes cases 
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"interpreted in the spirit of section 25(2) of the Constitution"23 in as far as it 
effects the compulsory giving up of land of the developer to the local 
authority. Heher JA therefore argued that the developer was entitled to 
compensation for the excess land that vested in the local authority. 
Furthermore, the high court distinguished the Arun case from the 
Helderberg Park Development decision on the basis that in the latter case 
a condition had been placed on the developer to cede additional land to 
the local authority without compensation. Since no condition had been 
placed on the developer in the Arun case, the high court found that it was 
not bound by the majority decision in the Helderberg Park Development 
case. Therefore, the high court followed the minority judgment of Heher JA 
in Helderberg Park Development and held that the excess land vested in 
the local authority in terms of section 28, and that the appellant was 
entitled to compensation in terms of the same section. The compensation 
was to be calculated in terms of the relevant provisions in the 
Expropriation Act.24 
It is difficult to see how the presence of the explicit condition in the 
Helderberg Park Development decision distinguishes it from the Arun 
decision. In Arun it was clear that no approval for subdivision would have 
been granted without the developer having made provision for extra land 
for the higher order roads as required by the structural plan. This creates 
the impression that the developer had to sacrifice the excess land for the 
higher order roads if it wanted to obtain approval for the development, and 
that awarding compensation in this instance was probably a just and fair 
outcome. However, since it is not clear what exactly compensation was 
awarded for, the question that still needs to be addressed is whether the 
compensation was awarded for deprivation or for expropriation of the 
excess land. 
The high court in Arun addressed neither the argument of the appellant 
that there was a taking of its land, nor the alternative argument that it had 
been constructively expropriated of its land in terms of section 26(1) of the 
                                                                                                                       
where a regulation that goes too far is treated as a regulatory taking for which 
compensation is payable: see Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses 423. 
23  Helderberg Park Development para 41. 
24  The High Court did not specifically state that compensation must be calculated in 
terms of s 12 of the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975, but since the appellant sought 
compensation as calculated in terms of s 12, it can be assumed that compensation 
was to be determined in terms of that section. 
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Expropriation Act.25 The appellant argued that the vesting that occurred in 
terms of section 28 of LUPO constituted a taking, or alternatively allowed 
for constructive expropriation, in terms of section 26(1) of the 
Expropriation Act. However, section 26(1) applies only if a local authority 
exercises the right to expropriate property or takes the right to use 
property temporarily as contemplated by section 5 of the Expropriation 
Act. Section 5(1) refers to cases where a "local authority has the power to 
expropriate or to take the right to use property temporarily". Therefore, 
reliance on section 26(1) was misplaced and the court was probably 
correct in avoiding this issue. 
The court held that since section 28 of the LUPO excludes compensation 
for the normal need land, compensation is automatically due if excess land 
vests in the local authority, since compensation is not specifically excluded 
in that instance. The court seems to find justification for this conclusion in 
the presumption that if land is confiscated from an owner, the owner is 
entitled to compensation unless the legislation specifically excludes 
compensation.26 The court did not consider whether the vesting of excess 
land amounts to a justifiable limitation of the right not to be deprived of 
property arbitrarily in terms of section 25(1) of the Constitution. The court 
awarded compensation for the land that the appellant lost and for which 
section 28 of the LUPO did not specifically exclude compensation. 
2.3 Supreme Court of Appeal 
The City appealed and the Supreme Court of Appeal considered whether 
the respondent (Arun Property Development), on a particular interpretation 
of section 28 of the LUPO, was entitled to compensation for the excess 
land that vested in the City.27 Given the high court's reliance on the 
minority judgment in Helderberg Park Development, the Court also 
considered whether section 28 of the LUPO constitutes an expropriation of 
property. The Court interpreted section 28 from the perspective that the 
purpose of the LUPO is to regulate orderly township development. 
According to the Supreme Court of Appeal, the primary purpose of section 
28 is to make land available to the local authority for the creation of public 
streets and places to enable the local authority to fulfil its obligation in 
terms of the particular development that it has approved. This purpose 
                                            
25  Arun Property Development (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town 2012 ZAWCHC 399 para 
7. 
26  See Arun Property Development (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town 2012 ZAWCHC 399 
paras 9-10. 
27  City of Cape Town v Arun Property Developments (Pty) Ltd 2014 JDR 0786 (SCA) 
56. 
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adequately justifies the deprivation that this provision effects. Therefore, 
section 28 of the LUPO does not authorise the expropriation of land in 
excess of the normal need caused by the development; if it did, its 
constitutional validity would be questionable, since such an interpretation 
would fall foul of the prohibition against the arbitrary deprivation of 
property in section 25(1) of the Constitution.28 However, it was 
unnecessary for the court to consider whether the vesting of the excess 
land in the local authority amounted to an arbitrary deprivation of property. 
The Court held that "there is no factual foundation to conclude that there is 
indeed excess land".'29 Therefore, the appellant was not entitled to 
compensation, but had to resort to its administrative remedies to obtain 
appropriate relief for excess land that may have vested in the City. 
The Court held that no compensation was payable, because it was not 
shown that there was any excess land. However, the Court indicated that 
if there were excess land, section 28 of the LUPO does not enable the 
expropriation of the excess land.30 In this regard it can be said that section 
28 does not authorise expropriation of any kind. It does not authorise an 
administrator to expropriate property by way of a formal expropriation 
procedure, which is arguably a requirement for the expropriation of 
property in South African law. Furthermore, this section does not authorise 
a court to order an expropriation in a case where the vesting of excess 
land occurs. 
2.4 Constitutional Court 
The appellant appealed to the Constitutional Court, which held that section 
28 of the LUPO vests ownership of all public streets and public places 
indicated in the subdivision plan in the local authority. Therefore, land that 
                                            
28  City of Cape Town v Arun Property Developments (Pty) Ltd 2014 JDR 0786 (SCA) 
para 23. 
29  City of Cape Town v Arun Property Developments (Pty) Ltd 2014 JDR 0786 (SCA) 
para 27. 
30  City of Cape Town v Arun Property Developments (Pty) Ltd 2014 JDR 0786 (SCA) 
para 23. In this regard the position adopted by the Supreme Court of Appeal is 
comparable to the decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court in BVerfGE 
58, 300 1981 (Naßauskiesung). In that decision the German Court held that a 
regulatory action that has a disproportionate effect on a property owner that cannot 
be justified by the purpose of the regulation, is invalid and cannot be transformed 
into an expropriation for which compensation is payable. The validity of the 
regulation must therefore be attacked and a claim for compensation does not arise 
since there was no authority for the expropriation. In terms of the Junktim-Klausel 
clause in German law, an expropriation is considered to be valid only if the 
expropriation is authorised by legislation which also sets out the manner in which 
compensation is to be determined: see Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses 
142. 
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is required for the provision of public streets and places needed for the 
particular development as well as land earmarked for public streets and 
places not strictly required for the particular development but required for 
higher order roads vests in the local authority. The Court held that section 
28 justifiably excludes compensation when the land that vests in the local 
authority relates to the provision of public streets and places arising from 
the normal need of the particular subdivision. In the Court's view, a 
developer that creates the need for public streets and places by applying 
for subdivision must sacrifice land free of charge for that purpose. The 
Court also stated that "it makes sense to expect the developer to bear the 
burden of providing the land, free of charge, for the purpose of public 
roads,"'31 since "[t]hey are the developer's 'give' for the value-add a 
subdivision approval brings".32 
The Court held that the vesting of the excess land in terms of section 28 of 
the LUPO can be seen as a "legislative acquisition of the developer's land 
without compensation".33 According to the Court there is no relation 
between the "compulsory taking away"34 of the excess land without 
compensation and the purpose of creating public streets and places for 
the particular development. Therefore, even though the excess land may 
be beneficial to the creation of regional roads, it is not an "adequate or 
compelling public consideration"35 for the local authority to acquire the 
excess land free of charge. Therefore, if compensation is not paid in the 
event that excess land vests in the local authority, section 28 of the LUPO 
will be in conflict with section 25(2) of the Constitution.36 
Given this approach, the Court considered whether the vesting of land in 
terms of section 28 of the LUPO constitutes an expropriation of property. 
The City's argument was that the reservation of public streets for future 
road networks constitutes a deprivation of property and not an 
expropriation. Even when the land that vests in the City exceeds the land 
strictly required for the creation of public streets and places for the 
particular development, this does not mean that the deprivation concerned 
is elevated to an expropriation. The City therefore maintained that the 
appellant had to show that the deprivation was arbitrary. 
                                            
31  Arun para 35. 
32  Arun para 40. 
33  Arun para 40. 
34  Arun para 40. 
35  Arun para 41. 
36  Arun para 41. 
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The Court accepted, without deciding that an "expropriation occurs by 
state coercion and without the consent of the affected owner".37 However, 
the loss of ownership in this instance was caused by legislation as soon as 
the approval for subdivision was granted and not by direct administrative 
action, which in the Constitutional Court's view did not assist the City's 
argument. The owner applying for subdivision would be aware of the fact 
that he has to sacrifice parts of the land for public streets and places, but 
not that he would have to sacrifice land unrelated to the normal need of 
the particular development. In this regard, the Court stated that the City 
had not forwarded any plausible reason or public interest why the vesting 
of the excess land was with the consent of the appellant.38 As a result, the 
Court held that if section 28 of the LUPO vests land beyond the normal 
need arising from a particular subdivision, the owner is entitled to 
compensation. The City, relying on Reflect-All 1025 CC v MEC for Public 
Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng Provincial Government39 (hereafter 
Reflect-All), also argued that legislation preventing development on land 
does not amount to an expropriation but rather amounts to a deprivation of 
property. The Court distinguished Reflect-All on the basis that in Reflect-
All no land vested in the local authority; reliance on Reflect-All therefore 
did not prevent the appellant from claiming compensation for the 
expropriation of its property.40 The Court therefore held that since section 
28 constitutes an ex lege transfer of ownership, which has the same effect 
as an expropriation, compensation for the excess land calculated in terms 
of the Expropriation Act was payable to the appellant.41 
3 The vesting of land without compensation: 
development contributions and the difference 
between deprivation and expropriation 
                                            
37  Arun para 58, with reference to Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 344. 
38  The City also argued that the appellant should have exhausted the available 
remedies before claiming compensation. In this regard, the City suggested that Arun 
could have sought the amendment of the structure plan that provided for public 
roads in excess to those required for the specific development, or could have 
instituted review proceedings and requested that the decision to reserve excess land 
be set aside. The Court was of the view that since the transfer of ownership occurred 
by operation of law, and that since it was akin to an expropriation, the appellant had 
a statutory right to compensation and therefore could rely on this right directly. 
39  2009 6 SA 391 (CC). 
40  Arun para 62. 
41  Even though the Court held that reliance on Reflect-All did not prevent the appellant 
from claiming compensation for the expropriation of its property, the Court did not 
clearly state that the compensation it eventually awarded was for the expropriation of 
the appellant's property. 
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The Constitutional Court held that section 28 of the LUPO vests all land 
required for public streets and places indicated in the subdivision plan in 
the local authority regardless of whether or not the land is strictly required 
for the establishment of public streets and places for the particular 
development. However, the Court distinguished between the vesting of 
land based on the normal need and the vesting of land in excess of the 
normal need, and also judged its validity in terms of different 
considerations. 
With regard to the land based on the normal need, the Court held that it is 
legitimate to expect the developer to donate land free of charge for the 
establishment of public streets and places, since the developer created 
the need for such streets and places in the first place, and donating such 
land free of charge is considered to be the developer's contribution 
towards the value-add that the approval of the subdivision brings. The 
Court's argument in this regard is in line with the notion of development 
contributions (or "exactions", in terms of United States law) in 
constitutional property law.42 In terms of this notion, a developer seeking 
permission to develop land must donate land to the local authority if that 
land is necessary for the provision of public streets.43 This makes it 
possible for the local authority to fulfil its obligations with regard to 
providing public streets and places and therefore no compensation is 
payable for the land required for these public streets and places, which 
usually vest in the local authority. Without the possibility of acquiring land 
in this manner, the authority would either fail in its obligations with regard 
to the particular development or be forced to negotiate the purchase of the 
land to fulfil them. In terms of US law, requiring exactions in return for the 
approval of a development is a legitimate exercise of the state's regulatory 
powers only if there is an "essential nexus"44 and "rough proportionality"45 
between the exaction and the impact of the development.46 In this regard, 
the Constitutional Court's view that land use regulation that requires a 
developer to part with land free of charge is legitimate as long as it relates 
                                            
42  For a discussion on development contributions, see Van der Walt Constitutional 
Property Law 290-292. 
43  See Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 290. 
44  Nollan v California Coastal Commission 483 US 825 (1987). See also Singer 
Introduction to Property 736-737. 
45  Dolan v City of Tigard 512 US 374 (1992). See also Singer Introduction to Property 
736-737. 
46  See Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 290. In South Peninsula Municipality v 
Malherbe 1999 2 SA 966 (C) 984G-I the court held that a development contribution 
is ultra vires and therefore invalid if it does not relate to the expected impact of the 
particular development. 
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to the provision of public streets and places based on the normal need of 
the development as sanctioned by section 28 of the LUPO accords with 
the position in US law. The sacrifice of land required for the provision of 
public streets and places for the particular development that is not 
disproportionate or excessive would in all probability not constitute an 
arbitrary deprivation of property and is arguably a justifiable limitation of 
the developer's right to property. It must be emphasised that it is accepted 
that development contributions, as part of the administrative process of 
approving developments, are regulatory in nature and their validity should 
therefore be judged in terms of the requirements for a deprivation in terms 
of section 25(1) of the Constitution. 
In this regard the Court correctly interpreted section 28 of the LUPO, 
which forms part of a bigger scheme that regulates orderly township 
development, as a development contribution requiring a developer to part 
with the needed land without compensation. It would therefore have been 
logical to also test the vesting of the excess land in the local authority in 
terms of the requirements for a valid deprivation in section 25(1) of the 
Constitution. This argument is underlined by the fact that there was no 
formal expropriation procedure and that the purpose of the LUPO is to 
regulate orderly township development.47 
Section 25(1) of the Constitution states that "[n]o one may be deprived of 
property except in terms of law of general application". A deprivation in 
terms of section 25(1) must therefore be authorised by law of general 
application.48 The Constitutional Court accepted that section 28 of the 
LUPO "does not authorise any deprivation beyond normal needs".49 It is 
clear that if the Court had judged the deprivation of the excess land with 
reference to the requirements for a valid deprivation, the deprivation of the 
excess land would have been unlawful, since there was no authority for 
the deprivation of the excess land. In the event that a deprivation is not 
authorised in terms of a law of general application, such a deprivation will 
be in conflict with section 25(1) and therefore invalid. 
                                            
47  See Gildenhuys and Grobler "Expropriation" paras 28-35 for a description of the 
expropriation procedure in terms of the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975. 
48  See Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 232. 
49  Arun para 60. The Court held that any deprivation beyond the normal need would be 
arbitrary due to a lack of authority. In this regard, the Court is not entirely correct. If s 
28 of the LUPO does not authorise any deprivation beyond the normal need and 
excess property were to vest, it would not be arbitrary due to a lack of authority, but 
invalid due to a lack of authority. The question of arbitrariness does not arise in 
cases where there is no authority for the deprivation. 
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The fact that there is no authority for the deprivation of the excess land 
also has implications for viewing the vesting of the land as an 
expropriation and the appropriateness of awarding compensation. In First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African 
Revenue Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of 
Finance50 (hereafter FNB) the Court held that all expropriations are 
deprivations and that all expropriations must first be judged in terms of the 
requirements for a valid deprivation in terms of section 25(1). If the vesting 
of the excess land constitutes an expropriation, such an expropriation 
would also be invalid in that the deprivation of the excess land is not 
authorised, and therefore by extension the expropriation is also not 
authorised. However, it has been customary to go directly to section 25(2) 
of the Constitution if it is clear that expropriation is at hand and only the 
public purpose or public interest requirement or the amount of 
compensation is at stake.51 In circumventing section 25(1) of the 
Constitution in this regard, the validity of any apparent expropriation must 
still be considered in terms of section 25(2) of the Constitution.52 
Even if the Court accepted that section 28 of the LUPO authorises the 
vesting of land beyond the normal need, the vesting of the excess land 
would probably constitute an arbitrary deprivation of property and would 
be invalid on that basis. In terms of the arbitrariness test set out in FNB,53 
a deprivation will be arbitrary if there is insufficient reason for the 
deprivation or if it is procedurally unfair. Sufficient reason may in some 
cases be established by a rationality-type test and in others by a 
proportionality-type test. In Arun there was arguably no rational 
relationship between the sacrifice that the appellant had to make with 
regard to the excess land and the impact of the particular development. 
The excess land that was acquired was wholly unrelated to the provision 
of public streets and places for the particular development. The Court 
even accepted that there was no relation between the acquisition of the 
excess land without compensation and the purpose of creating public 
roads for the development, which is the main concern of the rationality 
enquiry.54 The Court could therefore have invalidated the vesting of the 
                                            
50  2002 4 SA 768 (CC) para 46. 
51  See Du Toit v Minister of Transport 2006 1 SA 297 (CC); Haffejee v Ethekwini 
Municipality 2011 6 SA 134 (CC). Also see Slade "Less Invasive Means" para 3.3. 
52  See Erf 16 Bryntirion (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Public Works 2011 ZASCA 246. 
53  FNB para 46. 
54  At para 40 the Court in Arun stated that "[t]he compulsory taking away of the excess 
land without compensation is not properly related to the purpose of developing a 
township development with adequate public roads and spaces". 
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excess land in the local authority on the basis that it amounted to an 
arbitrary deprivation of property. 
The City also argued that the vesting of land in terms of section 28 of the 
LUPO does not constitute an expropriation but a deprivation, thereby 
urging the Court to apply the section 25(1) analysis. The City, as indicated 
above, relied on Reflect-All, where the Court held that the reservation of 
land for the creation of future road networks constitutes a deprivation and 
not an expropriation. The Court, however, distinguished the present matter 
from Reflect-All on the basis that in Reflect-All the land that was reserved 
for future road networks did not vest in the City. Since the Court had 
already indicated that section 28 of the LUPO vests all land earmarked for 
public streets and places in the local authority, it stated that the arguments 
raised by the City in this regard were "no bar to the appellant claiming 
compensation for the expropriation of its land".55 According to the Court's 
logic, the appellant was able to claim compensation from the local 
authority because the excess land vested in the City. If the excess land 
had not vested in the local authority, the Court would in all probability have 
followed Reflect-All and held that the appellant had been deprived of 
property, and judged the deprivation’s validity in terms of the requirements 
for a valid deprivation in section 25(1). However, just because the excess 
land vested in the local authority does not necessarily mean that the 
interference with the appellant's property rights cannot still be regarded as 
a deprivation and judged in terms of section 25(1). 
In relation to the argument of the City that the vesting of land in terms of 
section 28 of the LUPO constitutes a deprivation and not an expropriation, 
the Court noted that arguments with regard to the difference between 
deprivation and expropriation were not placed before it, nor had the lower 
courts discussed this issue. The Constitutional Court also refrained from 
engaging thoroughly with this issue, but incidentally considered whether 
the vesting of the land in terms of section 28 of the LUPO constituted an 
expropriation. 
The difference between a deprivation and an expropriation is not entirely 
clear. Deprivation is usually defined "by contrasting it in some way with 
expropriation".56 In the FNB decision the Constitutional Court held that 
expropriation is a subset of deprivation; all expropriations are also 
                                            
55  Arun para 62. 
56  Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 196. 
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deprivations, but not all deprivations will necessarily be expropriations.57 
With regard to the difference between deprivation and expropriation, the 
Constitutional Court in Agri South Africa v Minister for Minerals and 
Energy58 (hereafter Agri SA) held that "more is required to establish 
expropriation".59 In Agri SA the Court held that there can be no 
expropriation where a deprivation does not also result in the state 
acquiring the property.60 Therefore, an expropriation entails that the state 
acquires the property concerned, while a deprivation entails the regulation 
of property – presumably placing a limitation on one of the entitlements 
relating to property – without the state’s necessarily acquiring any 
property.61 
According to the Court's jurisprudence, state acquisition sets deprivation 
apart from expropriation. In Arun, the Court interpreted section 28 of the 
LUPO to cause all land indicated in the subdivision plan for public streets 
and places, irrespective of whether it was required for the particular 
development or for higher order roads, to vest in the local authority. The 
Court also refrained from evaluating the vesting of the excess land in the 
local authority in terms of section 25(1). Therefore, the legislative 
acquisition of the appellant's land, in as far as it related to the excess land, 
arguably constituted an expropriation for which compensation had to be 
paid. However, even if acquisition of property sets expropriation apart from 
deprivation since there can be no expropriation where the state does not 
acquire property,62 it does not mean that all instances of state acquisition 
can be seen as an expropriation. In some instances, state actions that 
result in the state’s acquiring property are not treated as expropriation but 
as a deprivation that must comply with the requirements in section 25(1) of 
the Constitution. For instance, the confiscation and forfeiture of property in 
terms of legislation is judged against the requirements for deprivation 
                                            
57  The Court also held that the distinguishing feature between a deprivation and an 
expropriation is that expropriation is compensated, while deprivation is not. 
58  Agri South Africa v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 4 SA 1 (CC) (hereafter 
Agri SA). 
59  Agri SA para 48. 
60  Agri SA para 59. 
61  See Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 196. The state, in exercising its 
regulatory powers, may in some cases destroy property when regulating property, 
but generally through regulation the state restricts the use, enjoyment and 
exploitation of property in some form or another, but leaves the property 
substantively intact: Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 196. 
62  Agri SA para 59. 
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found in section 25(1) of the Constitution.63 Furthermore, in terms of the 
notion of development contributions discussed above, the state acquires 
the land, but the acquisition is not viewed as an expropriation and its 
legitimacy is judged against the requirements for a valid deprivation in 
terms of section 25(1) of the Constitution. This was also accepted by the 
Court. However, the Court elected not to test the validity of the vesting of 
the excess land on the basis of the requirements for the deprivation of 
property in section 25(1) of the Constitution. 
The Court therefore did not evaluate the vesting of the excess land in the 
local authority in terms of section 25(1) of the Constitution, but instead 
awarded compensation for the legislative acquisition of the appellant's 
land. It is clear that the compensation was not awarded for a deprivation of 
the appellant's land. The question then remains whether the compensation 
was awarded for expropriation and if so for what type of expropriation.  
4 Compensation for statutory expropriation 
The Court held that the vesting of the excess land in the local authority in 
terms of section 28 constituted a legislative acquisition of property and that 
it had the same effect as an expropriation. Furthermore, the Court 
indicated that compensation would save the provision from being declared 
invalid in terms of section 25(2) of the Constitution.64 However, the Court 
neither explicitly confirmed that the appellant had been expropriated of 
land nor explicitly stated that the compensation it awarded was for the 
expropriation of such land. In the absence of a formal expropriation 
procedure, where an administrator – empowered by legislation – 
expropriates property, it can be asked whether the compensation was 
awarded for statutory expropriation. 
Certain foreign jurisdictions, like Germany, recognise statutory 
expropriation,65 which occurs when the state intends to expropriate 
property directly in legislation without any involvement of an administrator 
or the courts.66 The property concerned is expropriated for a public 
purpose through the mere promulgation of the particular legislation.67 The 
                                            
63  See Director of Public Prosecutions: Cape of Good Hope v Bathgate 2000 2 SA 535 
(C); National Director of Public Prosecutions v Prophet 2003 6 SA 154 (C). See 
further Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 314-333. 
64  Arun para 41. 
65  See Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses 147. 
66  Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 457. 
67  Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 457. See further Gildenhuys and Grobler 
"Expropriation" para 3. 
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Supreme Court of Appeal in Minister of Minerals and Energy v Agri SA68 
held that it had not been suggested that expropriation cannot be effected 
through statutory expropriation. Gildenhuys and Grobler69 also suggest 
that "legislative" expropriation is accepted in South African law.70 
However, recognising the apparent expropriation in the Arun decision as 
statutory expropriation poses difficulties on two counts. 
Firstly, it is questionable whether statutory expropriation can be 
recognised in South African law due to the constitutional requirement that 
an expropriation must be "in terms of law of general application". 
According to Van der Walt, this formulation does not provide for the 
expropriation to take place "by law of general application" but only "in 
terms of law of general application".71 This makes the acceptance of 
statutory expropriation unlikely in South African law. It would probably be 
in conflict with section 25(2) of the Constitution. If legislation, through mere 
promulgation, expropriates specific property, a constitutional challenge on 
the basis that expropriation may occur only in terms of a law of general 
application and not by a law of general application may be successful. 
Secondly, assuming that statutory expropriation can be recognised in 
South African law, the alleged expropriation in the present case does not 
fit the mould of statutory expropriation. Statutory expropriation entails the 
direct expropriation of identified properties for public purposes by 
legislation clearly and explicitly tailored for that purpose.72 It is clear that 
the legislature must intend to expropriate specified properties and must do 
so explicitly through the promulgation of legislation. In the present case, 
section 28 of the LUPO contains no provision to that effect. The section 
provides for the vesting of land without compensation only if that land 
relates to the normal need of creating public streets and places. 
Furthermore, the acquisition in terms of section 28 was/is not caused by 
the promulgation of legislation. The acquisition in the present case was 
caused by an administrative decision, not to expropriate, but to approve a 
subdivision plan. 
                                            
68  Minister of Minerals and Energy v Agri South Africa 2012 5 SA 1 (SCA) para 15. 
69  Gildenhuys and Grobler "Expropriation" para 3. 
70  Gildenhuys and Grobler "Expropriation" para 3 refer to FNB paras 57-59 and state 
that this "concept [legislative expropriation] is discussed in the context of the 
Customs and Excise Act 91 of 1964". However, in the relevant paragraphs of the 
FNB judgment no mention is made of the concept of legislative or statutory 
expropriation. Furthermore, the FNB decision dealt with the deprivation of property 
and not the expropriation of property, making any possible pronouncement on 
legislative expropriation obiter. 
71  Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 434. Own emphasis. 
72  Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 434. 
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Upon further analysis it appears that there is a another factor that weighs 
against statutory expropriation in the present case. The Court accepted 
that section 28 of the LUPO legitimately requires an owner applying for 
subdivision to donate land to the local authority for the creation of public 
streets and places. The contribution that the owner has to make is 
considered an acceptable limitation in terms of the notion of development 
contributions or exactions, as discussed above. The Court accepted that 
section 28 of the LUPO constitutes a development contribution for the land 
required for creating public streets and places for the particular 
development. Section 28 cannot also provide for expropriation through the 
promulgation of legislation. Consequently section 28 of the LUPO does not 
constitute statutory expropriation. 
5 Compensation: constructive expropriation 
In the analysis above it is pointed out that the Court evaluated the vesting 
of the land based on the normal need in terms of the notion of 
development contributions, which are understood to fall under the state's 
regulatory powers and are therefore judged in terms of the requirements 
for a valid deprivation. However, the Court did not evaluate the vesting of 
the excess land in the City in terms of the deprivation analysis. In this 
regard, the Court may have effectively sidestepped the issue of 
constructive expropriation. 
Constructive expropriation relates to a grey area that may exist between 
deprivation and expropriation.73 In terms of this notion, a deprivation (or 
regulatory measure) that is excessive – thereby making it impossible to 
justify the deprivation by the purpose of the regulation – is saved from 
invalidity due to the importance of the regulation by treating it as an 
expropriation for which compensation is payable.74 In terms of this 
doctrine, the regulation imposes a severe or excessive regulatory 
                                            
73  Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 350. The question whether constructive 
expropriation is recognised in South African law is contested. In Steinberg v South 
Peninsula Municipality 2001 4 SA 1243 (SCA), the Supreme Court of Appeal raised 
the idea of recognising constructive expropriation, but it was not necessary for the 
court to pronounce on this issue. Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 377 and 
Gildenhuys and Grobler "Expropriation" para 4 argue against recognising 
constructive expropriation. In an earlier work, Gildenhuys Onteieningsreg 140 left the 
question open whether or not constructive expropriation forms part of South African 
law. See further Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman's Law 
of Property 553-557; Mostert 2003 SAJHR. 
74  See Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 350. See also Badenhorst, Pienaar 
and Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman's Law of Property 553-554. 
BV SLADE PER / PELJ 2016 (19)  21 
 
 
limitation on a particular owner.75 The court transforms the deprivation into 
an expropriation for which compensation is payable.76 It is therefore clear 
that in terms of the doctrine of constructive expropriation a court considers 
whether the regulatory action imposes a severe or excessive burden on a 
particular owner and, instead of declaring it invalid, awards compensation. 
Therefore, constructive expropriation would be recognised only in cases 
where a court has considered whether a regulatory measure imposes a 
severe or excessive burden on a particular owner, and instead of declaring 
it invalid, awards compensation. The Court in Arun accepted that section 
28 of the LUPO vests all land identified for the use of public streets and 
places in the local authority. However, with regard to the vesting of the 
excess land the Court never considered whether the regulatory measure 
that caused the vesting imposed an excessive burden on the appellant. 
The Court held that the excess land vested in the local authority by means 
of a legislative acquisition. The fact that the Court in Arun never regarded 
the vesting of the excess land in the local authority as a regulatory 
measure counts against the recognition of constructive expropriation in 
this particular instance. 
Furthermore, if the Court had considered whether the vesting of the 
excess land in terms of a regulatory measure constituted a deprivation of 
property, the first question to ask would be whether there was any 
authority for the deprivation. The Court, as pointed out above, stated that 
section 28 of the LUPO does not authorise the deprivation of land beyond 
the normal need. If the Court had judged the vesting of the excess land in 
terms of section 25(1) of the Constitution, it would probably have held that 
the deprivation was invalid due to a lack of authority. If a deprivation is not 
authorised by a law of general application it is invalid, and compensation 
cannot render the deprivation valid. Therefore, since the Court never 
considered the vesting of the excess land in the local authority in terms of 
the requirements for a valid deprivation, but interpreted the legislative 
acquisition of land as analogous to an expropriation, the issue regarding 
constructive expropriation remains moot. 
6 Conclusion 
In the Arun decision the Constitutional Court framed the issue as being 
concerned with the expropriation of land and compensation. However, in 
this case there was no formal expropriation procedure whereby an 
                                            
75  Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 351-353. 
76  Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 351-353. 
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administrator expropriated property on the basis of authorising legislation 
by serving an expropriation notice on the property owner. The Court 
nevertheless awarded compensation for a regulatory measure that it 
interpreted to effect a vesting of excess land in the City, that it constituted 
an ex lege transfer of ownership (that has the same effect as an 
expropriation) and that the owner had to be compensated for the vesting 
of the excess land. 
In the absence of a formal expropriation procedure, this case note 
considered whether the compensation that the Constitutional Court 
awarded could have been for statutory expropriation or constructive 
expropriation. It was argued that it is unlikely that the compensation was 
awarded for the statutory expropriation of the excess land, in that the 
legislation does not provide for or effect the expropriation of any land, but 
merely allows for the vesting of land based on the normal need without 
any compensation. Although the outcome of the decision appears to point 
towards the recognition of constructive expropriation, it was argued that 
the compensation could not have been for a constructive expropriation 
because the Court did not consider the vesting of the excess land to be a 
regulatory measure that may have had a disproportionate effect on the 
particular owner. By extension this also implies that the compensation 
could not have been awarded for a regulatory measure that would have 
been invalid but for the payment of compensation. 
Therefore, the compensation was not awarded for a formal expropriation, 
since there was no formal expropriation procedure. It is also argued that 
the compensation could not have been awarded for a statutory 
expropriation or for constructive expropriation. In this regard it remains 
unclear for what type of infringement the Court awarded compensation. 
This decision therefore creates uncertainty with regard to when a claimant 
is entitled to compensation for an expropriation in the absence of a formal 
expropriation procedure or the authority to expropriate. 
It is trite that the state can regulate the use, enjoyment and exploitation of 
property in terms of enabling legislation, and that such regulation must 
comply with the requirements set out in section 25(1) of the Constitution. 
The state may also expropriate property on the basis of authorising 
legislation and the expropriation must also comply with the requirements 
set out in section 25(2) of the Constitution.77 The authority to regulate and 
                                            
77  A deprivation and expropriation that is effected through an administrative action is 
also reviewable in terms of the Promotion of Access to Administrative Justice Act 3 
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expropriate must therefore flow from specific legislation that authorises the 
particular action. It is imperative that the legislation must be specific as to 
the type of action that is authorised. For instance, the South African 
National Roads Agency Limited and National Roads Act,78 amongst 
others, specifically authorises the minister of transport to expropriate 
property for the construction of national roads. The LUPO, on the other 
hand, regulates orderly township development and is not specifically 
intended to expropriate property. In certain instances the municipality may, 
through regulation, acquire land that is required to provide the 
development it has approved with public streets and places, but the 
acquisition of this normal land should occur strictly in terms of a regulatory 
framework. The LUPO, as a regulatory measure, does therefore not 
authorise the City (or the state) to expropriate property. As a result, the 
award of compensation in the Arun decision for an alleged expropriation 
seems to have been misplaced. 
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